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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3349 
______________ 
 
MARY LAROCHELLE; SANDRA RIKER; EMILIA SHEARER;  
CANDICE GALBREATH; NICOLE VASQUEZ 
 
v. 
 
WILMAC CORPORATION; WILMAC HEALTH CARE, INC;  
MCWIL GROUP LIMITED; LANCASHIRE HALL 
 
        Sandra Riker; Emilia Shearer, 
                                                        Appellants 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-12-cv-05567) 
District Judges: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel and Marilyn Heffley 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 22, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 Plaintiffs Sandra Riker and Emilia Shearer brought employment discrimination 
claims against their former employer, Wilmac Corporation, Wilmac Health Care, Inc., 
McWill Group Limited, and Lancashire Hall (“the Facility”) (collectively 
“Defendants”).1  They alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951-963, and Pennsylvania common law.2  
The District Court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all of Riker’s and 
Shearer’s claims except for Shearer’s retaliation claims under the ADA and PHRA.  
Larochelle v. Wilmac Corp., 210 F. Supp. 3d 658, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“LaRochelle I”), 
clarified on denial of recons., No. 12-CV-5567, 2016 WL 6135577 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 
2016) (“LaRochelle II”).  Following a bench trial on Shearer’s remaining claims,3 the 
Court entered judgment for Defendants.  LaRochelle v. Wilmac Corp., No. CV 12-5567, 
2017 WL 4475964 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2017) (“LaRochelle III”). 
Riker appeals the District Court’s orders granting summary judgment to 
Defendants and denying her motion for reconsideration with respect to her claims for 
Title VII and ADA retaliation, wrongful discharge, and Title VII and PHRA hostile work 
environment.4  Shearer appeals the Court’s order granting summary judgment and 
                                              
1 Three other Plaintiffs are not involved in this appeal.   
2 Plaintiffs Riker and Shearer withdrew their claims under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.    
3 The parties consented to trial before a United States Magistrate Judge.    
4 Riker waived any challenge to her claims of associational race discrimination 
under Title VII and §1981 and ADA discrimination because they were “not squarely 
3 
denying her motion for reconsideration on her claims for wrongful discharge and under 
Title VII and § 1981 for hostile work environment,5 as well as the trial verdict on her 
claims for ADA and PHRA retaliation.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I6 
A 
 We first address Riker’s appeal of the order granting summary judgment on all of 
her claims.  We begin by setting forth the relevant facts.  
 Defendants hired Riker as a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”)7 in 2009.  Riker 
claims that starting in 2010, CNA Teddy Bernard subjected her and other female staff to 
                                              
argued.”  John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
5 Shearer presented no arguments challenging the dismissal of her ADA and 
gender discrimination claims or her Title VII and § 1981 national origin-based 
discrimination claims.  Thus, those claims are waived.   
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s order granting 
summary judgment is plenary, Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 
418 (3d Cir. 2013), and we view the facts and make all reasonable inferences in the non-
movant’s favor, Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party 
fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to 
which she has the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
An appeal of a motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for 
review.”  Quality Prefabrication Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 
1982).  By appealing the order denying reconsideration of an order granting summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs essentially argue that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment.  
7 CNAs are “principal caregivers” who “help care for ill, injured, disabled, or 
infirm individuals confined to nursing facilities” by, among other things, serving meals, 
assisting with personal care, and performing light cleaning.  App. 1156.  Charge Nurses 
4 
sexual harassment and that she complained to supervisors about Bernard’s behavior 
several times before June 2011.  In June 2011, Riker informed the Director of Human 
Resources that Bernard came from behind and hugged her, that his “behavior has largely 
been ignored by licensed staff,” and that she “fear[ed] retaliation” for reporting his 
conduct.  App. 1160.  Bernard was suspended pending the investigation and ultimately 
terminated.   
During 2011, Riker sought workers’ compensation for two injuries she identified 
as work-related.8  The last day Riker worked for Defendants was in early January 2012.  
In early January, Riker’s physician told her that she could return to work later that month 
if she performed light duty with weight restrictions.  Riker faxed this report to the 
Director of Human Resources.  The Director of Human Resources informed Riker that 
Defendants would not accommodate non-work-related injuries.  Riker subsequently filed 
for unemployment compensation and began collecting unemployment benefits the first 
week of February 2012.9   
In February 2013, Riker signed, and a workers’ compensation court approved, a 
compromise and release agreement (“C&R”), “full[y] settl[ing] . . . all claims against 
[Defendants] for all injuries Claimant sustained on 10/30/11 or 2/1/11 or at any other 
                                              
supervise CNAs.  The Charge Nurses, in turn, are overseen by the Shift Supervisors, who 
in turn report to the Director of Nursing (“DON”).   
8 Defendants’ Workers’ Compensation Policy provides in relevant part that “[a]ll 
employees are covered by Worker’s Compensation insurance when a job injury or work-
related illness occurs” and “[e]mployees must report all work-related injuries 
immediately to their charge supervisor.”  App. 889.  
9 An employee can be eligible for unemployment benefits if she takes a leave of 
absence due to health problems.   
5 
time Claimant was employed by Defendant.”  App. 1177.  On the same day, Riker signed 
a letter of resignation stating in full: “I Sandra Riker hereby voluntarily resign my 
employment from Lancashire Hall/McWill Group.  This resignation is voluntary.  I was 
not coerced by anyone into making this decision.”  App. 1187.  Riker was represented by 
counsel when she signed these documents and testified before the workers’ compensation 
court that she read and understood the C&R and related documents, including the 
resignation.   
1 
Viewing these facts in Riker’s favor, we examine Riker’s claim that Defendants 
violated Title VII and the ADA by retaliating against her for reporting sexual harassment 
and for seeking work-related injury accommodations, and that they wrongfully 
discharged her for engaging in the protected activity of filing workers’ compensation 
claims.  The Title VII and ADA claims are assessed under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, the first step of which involves evaluating plaintiff’s prima facie case.  Doe 
v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008).  To state a prima facie case 
for retaliation under the federal employment statutes, Riker must establish that (1) she 
engaged in protected activity, (2) Defendants took an adverse employment action against 
her, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and Defendants’ adverse 
action.  See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(retaliation).  Similar to the adverse-employment-action requirement of the federal 
employment statutes, a Pennsylvania common law claim for wrongful discharge requires, 
6 
at a minimum, retaliatory termination.  See Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 563 (Pa. 
2009). 
Riker fails to show that Defendants terminated her or took an adverse action 
against her.  Riker voluntarily resigned in February 2013.  Voluntary resignation is not an 
adverse employment action.  See Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 
186 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that unless there is a claim for constructive discharge—
which Riker does not make—voluntary resignation does not constitute adverse 
employment action); cf. Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“If a[] [government] employee retires of his own free will, even though prompted to do 
so by some action of his employer, he is deemed to have relinquished his property 
interest in his continued employment for the government, and cannot contend that he was 
deprived of his due process rights.”).  Moreover, Riker resigned with the assistance of 
counsel and as part of a court proceeding where she had the opportunity to ask the 
workers’ compensation judge about it.  This circumstance undercuts the conclusory 
affidavit of her coworker and her self-serving affidavit claiming that Defendants’ lawyers 
told her she “had to sign a resignation or [she] could not settle,” and that she was 
terminated a year prior to the resignation letter.10  SA 240 ¶ 22; see Kirleis v. Dickie, 
McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009).   
                                              
10 Defendants claim that prior to the voluntary resignation, Riker took a leave of 
absence for health reasons.  Specifically, in a questionnaire Defendants submitted to the 
state in April 2012, they indicated that Riker “voluntarily quit for health/medical reasons, 
went on a leave of absence.”  App. 1455.  The Director of Human Resources sent Riker 
letters in April and May 2012 regarding Riker’s obligation to pay her health insurance 
7 
Because Defendants did not terminate or take an adverse employment action 
against Riker, the District Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants on 
Riker’s retaliation and wrongful discharge claims.  
2 
The District Court also properly dismissed Riker’s Title VII and PHRA hostile 
work environment claims.  To establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim, a 
plaintiff must  
show that 1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of 
his/her [membership in a protected class such as sex], 2) the discrimination 
was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the 
plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable 
person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior 
liability. 
 
Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks an 
citations omitted).  “The first four elements of this claim establish that a hostile work 
environment existed.  The fifth element . . . establishes the basis on which to hold the 
employer liable.”  Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Employers are liable for the actions of a plaintiff’s non-supervisory 
coworkers “only if [(1)] the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint 
or . . . [(2)] the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take 
prompt and appropriate remedial action.”  In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 400 
(3d Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (quoting Huston, 568 F.3d at 104).  The elements 
                                              
premium because she had put herself on leave when she could not return to work.  This 
evidence thus shows that Riker was on leave and had not been fired.  
8 
for a PHRA hostile work environment claim are “coextensive[]” with a Title VII hostile 
work environment claim.  Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2006).  
Riker concedes that Bernard was a non-supervisory co-worker, but nonetheless 
contends that the District Court erred by dismissing her hostile work environment claim 
because the Court should not have accepted Defendants’ “blanket defense” that they were 
unaware of Bernard’s harassment until they received Riker’s letter in June 2011.  
Appellants’ Br. at 37.  The record, however, shows that the first time Riker complained 
about Bernard’s actions towards her was in June 2011, and Defendants promptly 
investigated and terminated him.  Riker only offers her own statements as evidence that 
Defendants knew of Bernard’s harassment prior to June 2011, but these “conclusory, self-
serving” statements are “insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment” on 
her hostile work environment claim.  Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 161 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Therefore, the Court properly granted summary judgment for 
Defendants on Riker’s Title VII and PHRA hostile work environment claims.  
B 
 We next turn to Shearer’s challenges to the District Court’s summary judgment 
rulings on her wrongful discharge as well as her Title VII and § 1981 hostile work 
environment claims.  We will first set forth the relevant facts drawn from the summary 
judgment record.  
Shearer initially worked on the Baker Wing but asked to be transferred because a 
coworker refused to work with her due to her nationality and criticized the way she spoke 
9 
English and cared for residents.  She was transferred to the Rehab Wing, where she 
claims that one Charge Nurse called her offensive names and instructed other staff not to 
assist her, and the other Charge Nurse tolerated the first’s discriminatory comments, 
assigned her harder tasks, and accused her of faking injuries.  At some point, Shearer was 
transferred back to Baker Wing.11    
During a shift one morning in September 2011, Shearer fell while assisting a 
resident.  Riker and a Charge Nurse heard but did not see Shearer fall and helped her 
from the floor.  Later during that shift, Shearer told a resident not to touch items on the 
clean linen cart with his dirty hands.  Shearer was accused of yelling at the resident in 
violation of the Resident Abuse Policy.12  Shearer denied yelling at the resident but 
admitted that she has “a loud voice” and she was “a distance away” from the resident and 
the linen cart.  App. 716 ¶ 33.  Before leaving the facility that day, Shearer reported both 
the fall and the incident with the resident to the Shift Supervisor.   
The Director of Nursing (“DON”) called Shearer at home after her shift and 
informed her that she was suspended pending investigation of the alleged abuse.  Shearer 
returned to the facility and provided a statement to the DON, and then reported to the 
Director of Human Resources that she had fallen and was injured during her shift.  The 
Director of Human Resources had her fill out an incident report regarding the fall, and 
                                              
11 Her return to Baker Wing appears to have occurred while she was on light duty 
following an October 2010 or July 2011 injury. 
12 The Resident Abuse Policy provides that “all residents residing in [Defendants’] 
facilities deserve to live in a safe and protected environment from any form of verbal, 
mental, sexual, or physical abuse” and “[w]hen an employee is alleged to have abused a 
resident . . . the incident will be investigated.”  App. 643. 
10 
instructed her to see Defendants’ workers’ compensation physicians.13  At her 
appointment the following day, she was diagnosed with various sprains and strains and 
put on light duty.  The workers’ compensation doctor sent Defendants his report, which 
included the light duty restriction.   
In her investigation of the alleged abuse, the DON obtained statements from 
employees who were working at the time of the incident and concluded that the 
allegations were substantiated.  Defendants thereafter terminated Shearer’s employment 
for “resident abuse.”  App. 894.  
1 
 Shearer asserts that “by reporting a workplace injury to her employer” she 
“engaged in a protected activity that triggered public policy anti-retaliation protection,” 
and her termination “establish[ed] a claim of Wrongful Discharge.”  Appellants’ Br. at 
32.  Shearer is mistaken.  Wrongful discharge claims based on filing workers’ 
compensation claims require both (1) reporting the injury to the employer and 
(2) “express[ing] [an] intent” to the employer to file a workers’ compensation claim.  
Smith v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., Civ. No. 10-1417, 2011 WL 4346340, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 16, 2011); cf. Owens v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., 103 A.3d 859, 869 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2014) (holding that “a cause of action exists under Pennsylvania law for wrongful 
                                              
13 Shearer claims that this injury was “instantly reported” because a Charge Nurse 
heard her fall and helped her from the floor.  App. 690 ¶ 20, 715 ¶ 30.  Shearer also 
claims that when she reported both her fall and the abuse allegation to her Shift 
Supervisor, the Shift Supervisor told her that she could fill out the paperwork when she 
returned for her next shift.  The Shift Supervisor’s statement confirms that Shearer 
reported the fall before the end of her shift.   
11 
discharge of an employee who files a claim for workers’ compensation benefits with an 
employer [even where the employee] has not filed a claim petition with the Bureau”).  
Assuming Shearer reported her injury to the proper supervisor, the mere fact that she 
filled out an incident report stating she fell at work does not mean that she expressed to 
Defendants her intent to file a workers’ compensation claim.  Accordingly, the District 
Court did not err in its determination that Shearer presented no evidence that she notified 
Defendants of an intent to file a workers’ compensation claim and therefore summary 
judgment for Defendants on her wrongful discharge claim was warranted.    
2 
 Summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was also appropriate on Shearer’s hostile 
work environment claim.  Shearer asserts that “[s]he was the target of ridicule and false 
accusations,” because of her national origin and the way she speaks.  Appellants’ Br. at 
31.  The isolated comments Shearer describes, while distasteful, do not establish a hostile 
work environment.  Moreover, she was transferred to the Rehab Wing when she 
originally complained of harassment in the Baker Wing, and when she complained about 
treatment in the Rehab Wing, she was transferred back to the Baker Wing, where, at that 
point, she was working under different supervisors.  Thus, Defendants remediated the 
alleged harassment by moving her from work areas where she claimed to have been 
mistreated.  See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (“When confronted 
with allegations of . . . harassment, employers have a wide range of options, including 
terminating the offending supervisor or stepping in and removing the victim from the 
hostile work environment by, for example, a transfer.”), vacated on other grounds sub 
12 
nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly granted summary judgment for Defendants on Shearer’s hostile work 
environment claim.  
II 
We now turn to Shearer’s challenges to the District Court’s verdict in favor of 
Defendants on her ADA and PHRA retaliation claims.  Shearer seeks to overturn the 
verdict based upon (1) an evidentiary ruling and (2) purported misapplication of the 
pretext standard.14 
A 
 At trial, Shearer testified that she tripped over a wheelchair and fell during her 
shift.  Riker and a Charge Nurse heard but did not see her fall and rushed to assist her 
from the floor.15  Despite the fall, Shearer continued working.   
Toward the end of Shearer’s shift, she saw a resident known to have hygiene 
issues across the hallway helping himself to items on the clean linen cart and she loudly 
instructed him not to touch the cart and told him that she would assist him as soon as she 
                                              
14 “On appeal from a bench trial, our court reviews a district court’s findings of 
fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.  For mixed questions of law and 
fact we apply the clearly erroneous standard except that the District Court’s choice and 
interpretation of legal precepts remain subject to plenary review.  To the extent that the 
District Court’s conclusions rested on credibility determinations, our review is 
particularly deferential.”  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282-
83 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Frederick L. v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 364 F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir. 2004) (appeal following bench 
trial in employment discrimination case). 
15 This Charge Nurse testified that while she supervised CNAs, including Shearer 
on occasion, Shearer was not under her supervision at the time of the accident.  
13 
finished her tasks.  Shearer testified that she warned a CNA on the next shift, who had 
been closer to the clean linen cart than Shearer during the interaction with the resident, 
that the resident was upset.  Shearer also testified that the other CNA told Shearer that 
Shearer was rude to the resident.16  This CNA later reported to the DON that Shearer was 
abusive to the resident.  Riker and a Charge Nurse both testified that they heard part of 
the interaction between Shearer and the resident and did not think Shearer acted 
inappropriately.  Shearer testified that, at the end of her shift, she told her Shift 
Supervisor about both her fall and the incident with the resident.   
Pursuant to the Resident Abuse Policy, Shearer was suspended pending the abuse 
investigation.  During the investigation, the DON collected statements regarding the 
allegations including from Shearer, a social worker who spoke to the resident, two CNAs 
from the morning shift, and a Charge Nurse who witnessed the incident.  The DON 
conceded that she did not have statements from the Charge Nurse who testified that she 
witnessed the interaction or the Shift Supervisor to whom Shearer reported the incident.17  
The DON further testified that she did not investigate whether the resident presented a 
safety concern because “[her] investigation was in regards to [Shearer’s] behavior 
towards the resident,” and not “the infection control policy.”  App. 3446.  When asked 
whether Shearer was engaged in the type of “medically required” loud voice excluded 
from the resident abuse policy, App. 3009, she responded “[y]ou do not need to raise 
                                              
16 Two witnesses testified that the CNA who reported the alleged abuse 
specifically disliked Shearer.   
17 Riker, who was assigned to the resident and heard part of Shearer’s interaction 
with him, testified the DON never asked Riker about the alleged abuse.   
14 
your voice to have conversation with [the resident].  So it wasn’t medically necessary for 
her to raise her voice,” App. 3446.  The DON testified that Shearer was fired because 
“she yelled at the resident, raised her voice to unacceptable tone and was redirecting the 
resident from the area he was permitted to be in.”  App. 3491.   
Shearer saw Defendants’ workers’ compensation doctor the morning after the 
incident and was put on modified duty.  She was discharged from care and permitted to 
resume full duty work approximately two weeks later, but by then she had been 
terminated.  
B 
Shearer argues that the District Court erred by admitting the unverified 
handwritten statements the DON collected in the course of her investigation.  These 
statements were in Shearer’s personnel file and, therefore, Defendants sought to 
introduce them (1) under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and (2) as 
nonhearsay evidence of what the DON considered in reaching her decision to terminate 
Shearer.  The Court overruled Shearer’s objection, deemed the statements nonhearsay, 
and considered the DON’s reliance on these statements in its findings of fact.  See 
LaRochelle III, 2017 WL 4475964, at *4 & n.4.   
The District Court correctly admitted these nonhearsay statements because they 
were not offered to prove whether Shearer abused the resident.18  See Fed. R. Evid. 
801(c)(2).  Rather, because Defendants offered these statements “to explain why” they 
                                              
18 “Whether a statement is hearsay is a legal question subject to plenary review.” 
United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2006).   
15 
terminated Shearer, that is, “for the statements’ effect on the listener—those statements 
[were] not offered for their truth.  Therefore, they [are] admissible for a non-hearsay 
purpose.”  United States v. Edwards, 792 F.3d 355, 357 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015).  As a result, 
the Court did not err in admitting the statements. 
C 
Shearer also argues that the District Court erred by entering judgment in favor of 
Defendants because she established a causal connection between her protected activities 
and her termination “a mere three . . . days after she reported a work injury and 
two . . . days after her request for accommodation” and because Defendants’ investigation 
into the alleged abuse was inadequate.  Appellants’ Br. at 52.   
To prove causation at the pretext stage for an ADA or PHRA retaliation claim, the 
plaintiff must show that her protected activity was the “but-for” cause of the adverse 
employment action.19  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352, 362 
(2013) (holding that the Title VII “require[s] proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-
for cause of the challenged employment action”); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police 
Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting ADA and PHRA claims involve 
same elements).  In other words, at the pretext stage, “the plaintiff must be able to 
                                              
19 Causation is part of both the prima facie and pretext stages, but the type of 
causation that must be shown at each point differs.  See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 
206 F.3d 271, 286 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that causation questions asked at prima 
facie and pretext stages are “quite similar” but not identical).  To establish causation at 
the prima facie stage, a plaintiff must introduce evidence about the “scope and nature of 
conduct and circumstances that could support the inference” of a causal connection 
between the protected activity and adverse action.  Id. at 279.   
16 
convince the factfinder both that the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that 
retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.”  Krouse v. Am. 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 1997). 
A plaintiff cannot merely ask a factfinder to draw inferences from temporal 
proximity or holes in the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason.  “[P]roof that 
the employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not 
necessarily establish that the plaintiff’s proffered reason . . . is correct. . . . [I]t is not 
enough . . . to dis[]believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s 
explanation of intentional discrimination.”  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000) (alteration in original) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, 
and citations omitted). 
Even if Shearer demonstrated that Defendants’ investigation into the alleged abuse 
allegation was inadequate or that the timing of her termination was suspicious, the 
District Court had sufficient evidence to find that Shearer failed to demonstrate that the 
DON terminated her because she sought accommodation for her injury.  See Reeves, 530 
U.S. at 148.  Several witnesses told the DON about Shearer’s interaction with the resident 
and there was no evidence the DON’s decision to address that conduct was influenced by 
Shearer’s visit to the workers’ compensation doctor or her need to perform light duty.  
Therefore, the District Court correctly entered a verdict for Defendants on Shearer’s 
ADA and PHRA retaliation claims.  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
